St. John's Law Review
Volume 50, Summer 1976, Number 4

Article 3

Trademarks as Tying Products: The Presumption of Economic
Power
Stephen J. Smirti Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
TRADEMARKS AS TYING PRODUCTS: THE
PRESUMPTION OF ECONOMIC POWER
It is by constitutional mandate' that Congress possesses the
power to legislate in the area of inventions2 and literary works. 3 Via
this power, the framers of the Constitution sought to foster congressional encouragement of the arts and sciences. It was hoped
that society would benefit by the introduction of new products into
the economy with the resultant increase in employment and development of a better life for all. 4 In exercising this power, Congress

resolved to grant authors and inventors a limited monopoly with
respect to their contributions. 5 Consequently, when Congress
enacted the first body of antitrust legislation, patents and copyrights were excluded from its ambit, and have since been viewed as
well-recognized exceptions to the congressional policy favoring unrestrained trade in interstate commerce. 6 It should be noted, how'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors And Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries ......
2 A patent has been defined as "a grant of some right or privilege by a government or
sovereign to one or more individuals." 8 J. VoN KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 59.02[I][a] (1975). A patent is a legal grant securing to the inventor or
discoverer the exclusive right to "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof ..
" 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1970). The term for which the patent is granted is 17 years. Id § 154. A patent is personal
property; it may be transferred by assignment or may be the subject of a licensing agreement. 8 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 59.02[I][a] (1975).
A patent is limited in scope to the invention as it is described in the patent application. Id.
The effect of a patent is to legally restrain others from manufacturing, using, or selling the
product covered by the patent. Id.
A copyright is a legal grant which secures to an author the exclusive right "[t]o print,
reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1970). The period
for which a copyright is granted is 28 years from the date of first publication, although in
certain instances it is subject to a renewal and extension for a further 28-year period. Id. §
24. Copyrights may be procured for all works not in the public domain. Id. § 8.
4 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
5 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973). The constitutional nmandate "to
promote" has been equated with such expressions as "to encourage," "to stimulate," or "to
induce." Id Because public policy favors the disclosure of ideas, the patent monopoly is
designed not only to encourage invention, but more importantly to encourage the inventor
to make his invention available to the public. Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465
F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 939 (1974). Consequently, it has been
held that a patent grant must add to the body of public knowledge rather than remove
knowledge from the public domain. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966);
Commissioner of Patents v. Deutsche Gold-Und-Silber-Scheideanstalt Vormas Roessler, 397
F.2d 656, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
6
J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 59.02 [2][a] (1975).
The objective of both the antitrust laws and patent and copyright statutes is the promotion
of competition. Id.
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ever, that the grant of a limited patent or copyright monopoly was7
never intended to be a license for violating the antitrust laws.
Attempts by a patent or copyright owner to extend his limited
statutory monopoly to areas not protected by the grant have been
summarily halted by the courts. 8 In preventing a patent or
copyright owner from extending his monopoly by effectuating an
antitrust tying violation, the courts have presumed the existence of
sufficient economic power necessary to constitute a per se violation. 9 The patent and copyright owner must thus walk a thin line
between his valid personal interest in protecting the object of his
patent or copyright and the overwhelming policy of free competition. 10
The trademark, unlike the patent and the copyright, does not
have a constitutional origin; its genesis has deeper roots in the
common law." In a sense, a trademark provides an even greater
monopoly than does a patent or copyright. 12 The development of
its coexistence with the antitrust laws has differed from that of
patents and copyrights. Although attempted extensions of the
trademark monopoly have in some instances been upheld, courts,
on occasion, have invoked the presumption that sufficient economic power necessary for a tying violation exists where the
trademark owner attempts to extend his monopoly to areas not
covered by the mark. Whether such a presumption should be
invoked has recently been the subject of conflict among the circuits.'

3

7Id.

'See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (attempted
extension of the copyright monopoly); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) (attempted extension of the patent monopoly).
9E.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). For a definition of the term
"tying arrangement," see text accompanying notes 14-16 infra.
10
See text accompanying notes 163-166 infra.
Iij. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.01 (1974). "A trade-mark is

fundamentally a commercial rather than a legal device. In the United States, trade-mark
rights result from use and not from any public grant or franchise ... " Diggins, Trade-Marks
and Restraints of Trade, 32 GEO. L.J. 113, 115 (1944). See also Brown & Cohen, Franchise
Misuse, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1145, 1147 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Franchise Misuse].
12 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 513 n.6 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S.
125 (1965) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting in part). While the patent monopoly is granted for a
period of 17 years only, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970), and the copyright for a period of 28 years,
in certain instances subject to renewal for that same period, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970), the
trademark registration may be renewed for 20-year periods indefinitely. 15 U.S.C. §§
1058(a), 1059(a) (1970).
13 Compare Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972) (use of trademark as tying product warrants presumption of sufficient
economic power), and Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d
1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972), with Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten
Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974).

1976]

TRADEMARKS AS TYING PRODUCTS
THE ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS

Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ...."14 One example of a
contract in restraint of trade is a tying arrangement. A tying arrangement is an agreement whereby a party sells one product, the
tying product, only on condition that the buyer also purchase a
different product, the tied product.' 5 A tying arrangement is per
se violative of the Sherman Act when two conditions are present:
(1) wherever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to
the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the
tied product, and (2) a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce is affected.' 6 The sufficient economic power criterion has
1415 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
,5Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). They seldom serve any
purpose other than supression of competition, id. at 6, and have been singled out by
Congress because of the oppressive nature of the arrangement. Advance Business Sys. &
Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
The fundamental economic evil inherent in a tie-in "is that it denies competitors free access
to the tied product market, not because the party imposing the [tie] has a superior product
in that market, but because of the power or leverage" he is able to exert with the tying
product over the buyer. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). Accord, United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d
505, 511 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting in
part).
'6See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054,
1056 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 1508 (1976); United States v.Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 554 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See also
McCarthy, Trademark Franchisingand Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 CALIF. L. REV.
1085, 1097 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Trademark Franchising].
Proof of a per se violation offers the plaintiff an advantage, since "no specific showing
of [an] unreasonable competitive effect is required." Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969). The ability to prove a per se violation of the
Sherman Act avoids the need for "an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in
an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable- an
inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Where a per se violation is involved, the necessity for an in depth judicial
investigation has been mitigated since Congress has determined its own criteria of public
harm; thus, it is not for the courts to decide whether any injury has occurred in an
individual case. Donlan v. Carvel, 209 F. Supp. 829, 831 (D. Md. 1962). While it has been
said that proof of a tying arrangement warrants a conclusive presumption of illegqlity,
Northern Pac Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), citing International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), the courts have held that the per se doctrine is not to be
indiscriminately invoked. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). A tie-in will be justified where it can be
shown that the tying product is a novel and complex device used in conjunction with other
intricate mechanisms. In such a case, the tied product is forced upon the buyer not to extend
the monopoly of the seller, but rather to protect the tying product from possibly fatal
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heretofore been presumed by the courts when the tying product
was patented or copyrighted. 1 7 The second requirement, that a not
insubstantial amount of interstate commerce be affected, is almost
always easily proved.1 8 Thus, unwilling purchasers subjected to
tying arrangements have normally been able to prove per se antitrust violations where a patent or copyright is involved.
The use of a trademark as a tying product frequently occurs in
franchise contracts. 19 Typically, a franchisor will require that the
franchisee purchase his total supply requirements from the franchisor or sources designated, as a condition to the franchisee's
obtaining the franchise and a license of the franchisor's trademark.
This may be achieved through either explicit contractual provisions 20 or a pervasive marketing scheme designed to effectuate the
same end. 21 The usual justification for this practice is that the
trademark owner is charged by law with a duty to protect the
integrity and good will of his mark, 22 and his failure to do so might
damages to its reputation should it malfunction as a result of being used with other
component products. 187 F. Supp. at 560. This presupposes the fact that the seller is unable
to provide reasonable specifications for the tied product. Once specifications can be given,
the justification for the tie-in ceases, and per se liability will be imposed. Id.; see Note,
Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-ins, Franchises,Territorials, and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 457, 458-65 (1966).

"7United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (copyrights); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948) (copyrights); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947) (patents).
18 In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), the
Supreme Court held that if the dollar amount of business foreclosed by the tie is substantial
enough so as not to be de minimis, it can be said that a not insubstantial amount of
commerce is affected. Id. at 501. In Fortner, the Court ruled that an annual foreclosure of
$200,000 by a tie-in is not de minimis. Id. at 502. See also Falls Church Bratwursthaus, Inc. v.
Bratwursthaus Management Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (E.D. Va. 1973) ("[u]nder most
of the post-Fortner decisions, any amount of interstate commerce restrained by an illegal
tie-in agreement constitutes a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce.")
" An all encompassing definition of the term franchise is found in a Washington statute
providing that a "franchise" is
an oral or written contract or agreement, either expressed or implied, in which a
person grants to another person, a license to use a trade name, service mark, trade
mark, logotype or related characteristic in which there is a community interest in
the business of offering, selling, distributing goods or services at wholesale or retail,
leasing, or otherwise and in which the franchisee is required to pay, directly or
indirectly, a franchise fee ....
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.010(4) (Supp. 1975). For another definition, see N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:10-3(a) (Supp. 1975). The Small Business Administration has projected that in
1976, there will be 655,000 franchise outlets. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, IMPACT OF
FRANCHISING
ON SMALL BUSINESS, S. REP. No. 1344, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., app. A (1970).
20
See, e.g., Complaint
6, at 2, Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc. 5 TRADE REG. REP.,
(1976-1 Trade Cas.) 60,786 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1976).
2
See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 78, 116 (E.D. Pa.
1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976), petitionfor cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3645 (U.S. Apr.
10, 1976) (No. 75-1636).
22 As a result of this duty, the defense of quality control has developed. It has been
argued that since trademark owners must protect the integrity and goodwill of their mark,
they should have the right to control the quality of products used in conjunction with the
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be grounds for cancellation of the mark. 23 At any rate, the
trademark owner must join the patent and copyright owner in
straddling the thin line between bona fide protection of his
monopoly and exposure to antitrust liability.
A trademark may be defined as a representation of future
performance established through past performance. Any attempt
to expand upon this definition leads to the heart of the conflict
among the federal courts concerning the use of trademarks as
tying products presumptively having sufficient economic power to
drive a tying arrangement.
DEVELOPMENT

OF

THE

PRESUMPTION

OF

ECONOMIC

POWER

IN

TRADEMARK CASES

The contention that sufficient economic power should be presumed where the tying product is a trademark met stiff resistance
when first introduced to the courts. In Susser v. Carvel Corp., 24 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was presented with a
challenge to the practices of the Carvel franchise system. Carvel
dealer-franchisees were obligated to conduct their business in actrademark. Courts, however, have consistently held that when reasonable specifications for a
standard of quality for the tied product can be made available, the quality control defense
must fail. Specification of the type and quality of the tied product is considered sufficient
protection of the goodwill of the trademark. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 657 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961). Furthermore, where a
trademark owner is able to articulate to his "designated suppliers" or "approved sources" the
necessary specifications for products used together with his trademark, an estoppel arises
barring him from raising the defense of quality control. In re Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 3
TRADE REG. REP. 20,441 (FTC 1973). See generally Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505,
515 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting in part),
wherein it is argued that Carvel has surmounted the difficulty of verbalizing something so
insusceptible of definition "as the desired texture and taste of an ice cream cone or sundae."
See also Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in TrademarkLicensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Quality Control].
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1064(e)(1), 1127 (1970). These sections provide for the maintenance of a quality control program in connection with the licensing of trademarks. For
example, the mark cannot be used to deceive the public. Id. § 1055. Moreover, the owner
must be able to exercise control over the use of the mark. Should he engage in conduct that
causes the mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin, the mark is deemed
abandoned. Id. § 1127(b). See Morse-Starrett Prods. Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796 (N.D.
Cal. 1949), appeal dismissed, 191 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1951), wherein the court stated:
If the owner of a trademark wants to license the use thereof to another and still
retain as his own the enjoyment of the rights stemming therefrom, he must do so in
such a way that he maintains sufficient control over the nature and quality of the
finished product, over the activities of the licensee, as will enable the licensor to
sustain his original position of guarantor to the public that the goods ... are of the
same nature and quality as . . . before the licensing ....

86 F. Supp. at 805. See also E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America,
167 F.2d 484, 490 (C.C.P.A. 1948).
24332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
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cordance with a Standard Operating Procedure Manual which governed the overall operation of each Carvel store by regulating the
types of products which could be offered, recipes, employees' uniform standards, etc. Each Carvel store was identical in design,
featuring the Carvel crown and cone trademark on the roof and
the name "Carvel" in neon lights. This design was protected by a
design patent. The ice cream sold by each store was processed from
a mix prepared according to a secret formula and dispensed from
a patented machine bearing the Carvel trademark. 25 The franchisees argued that the franchise agreements under which they
operated violated the antitrust laws in that they obligated each
dealer-franchisee to purchase directly from Carvel, or from a
Carvel-approved source, his supply of ice cream mix together with
certain other products used either in the preparation or sale of the
end product. Examples of these latter products, the tied products,
included items such as paper goods, napkins, cones, and spoons.
Chief Judge Lumbard, writing for the majority in part and
dissenting in part, was in the minority in his conclusion regarding
the defendant's liability for imposing the tying arrangement. Finding that the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States2 6 provided the criteria for a determination of whether
a tying arrangement is a per se violation of the antitrust laws,27
25

332 F.2d at 509.

26 356 U.S. 1 (1958).

27See note 16 supra. Prior to Northern Pacific, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), relied upon by the Carrel majority, the Supreme Court
made continued reference to the requirement that the tying product occupy a "monopolistic
position" in the market as the standard of economic power necessary to constitute a per se
violation of the antitrust laws. At issue was Times-Picayune's practice of requiring its
advertisers to purchase combined insertions in its advertising columns in both the morning
and evening newspapers it owned. The Government challenged this practice as violative of
the Sherman Act. The Court held that a tying arrangement had not been established
inasmuch as the advertisers regarded the morning and evening advertising space as "the
selfsame product." Id. at 613. Since a tying arrangement, by its very definition, requires the
presence of two distinct products, see text accompanying note 15 supra, an illegal tie-in could
not be proved.
In Northern Pacific, the Supreme Court was again faced with a governmental challenge
to an alleged tie-in. Northern Pacific had vast land holdings in several northwestern states.
By 1949, it had sold approximately 37 million acres of its holdings, most of the remainder
having been leased for one purpose or another. In many of its sales contracts and most of its
leases, the defendant inserted a "preferential routing" clause which compelled the grantee or
lessee to ship over Northern Pacific's railroad lines all commodities produced or manufactured on the land provided that its rates were equal to those of competing carriers. The
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against defendant.
Noting that it is the "pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue"
which make tie-ins a per se violation of law, the Court stated that "[tihey are unreasonable in
and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying
product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and a
,not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce is affected." 356 U.S. at 5-6. Thus, the
"monopoly power" standard of Times-Picayune was clearly relaxed. Trademark Franchising,
supra note 16, at 1097.
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Judge Lumbard applied the standard of "sufficient economic
power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product. 2 8 Noting that the
Supreme Court has invoked a presumption of sufficient economic
29
power where the tying product was patented or copyrighted,
Judge Lumbard, at this point dissenting, argued in favor of extending the presumption to the case where the tying product is
trademarked since a trademark provides a similar statutory
monopoly. 30 It is significant that the tying product in Carvel was the
trademark license, the essential element of the franchise, which
permitted the dealer to display, label, and sell his products as those
of Carvel.31 To dispel any misconception that Carvel's machine and
design patents were the tying products, the dissent characterized
these as mere reinforcements of the true tying product, the
trademark license. 3 2 Convinced of the existence of the requisite
elements of a tying arrangement, Judge Lumbard found the recF.2d at 512, quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
F.2d at 513; see cases cited in note 17 supra.
30332 F.2d at 513. Based on United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), Judge
Lumbard believed that despite the absence of sufficient economic data in the record, the
presumption should be invoked because the trademark was the principal feature of the
Carvel system and was recognized by the majority to be the tying product. 332 F.2d at 519.
See generally Collision, Trademarks- The Cornerstone of a Franchise System, 24 Sw. LJ. 247
(1970). It has been said that the very existence of tying arrangements imposed by a seller is
of "itself compelling evidence of the defendants great power." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958).
31 332 F.2d at 513. The trademark license in conjunction with the granting of a
franchise has been described as "a feudal enfeoffment of the franchisee, the franchisee
pledging service and commitment and the franchisor pledging aid and protection." Franchise
Misuse, supra note 11, at 1146. As one commentator has stated: "[A] trademark cannot be
assigned without a concurrent transfer of the entire goodwill of the business. The rule
against assignments without goodwill was based upon the assumption that the purchaser of
the trademarked product was entitled to associate the trademark with a favored source."
Krayer, Domestic TrademarkLicensing, 43 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 574 (1961) (footnote omitted).
The licensing of a trademark is excluded from the provisions of § 3 of the Clayton Act,
which also condemns tying arrangements. In pertinent part, the statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities . . . on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). It is well settled that the granting of a franchise and/or licensing of a
trademark does not come within the "goods, wares or merchandise" provision of the Clayton
Act. Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 661 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974); In re
7-Eleven Franchise Antitrust Litigation, 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,429, at 98,427 (N.D. Cal.
1974). See also Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). Thus, any attack on the franchise system as a vehicle
for effecting tie-ins must come under § 1 of the Sherman Act. This presupposes that the
tying product in the franchise situation will be the trademark license. Where the tying
product is a trademarked commodity, a § 3 Clayton Act violation may exist.
32 332 F.2d at 513.
28332
29 332

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:689

ord insufficient to sustain the quality control defense alleged by
33
Carvel.
Judges Friendly and Medina, constituting the majority of the
panel, agreed that the desirable item in the franchise system, the
true tying item, was the Carvel trademark "whose growing repute
was intended to help the little band of Carvel dealers swim a bit
faster than their numerous rivals up the highly competitive
stream. '34 Immediately following this observation, the majority acknowledged that a trademark could in some cases attain such a
degree of prominence that its use as a tying product would constitute a per se violation. 35 Declaring that such a trademark would
have to satisfy the market dominance test established by TimesPicayune Publishing Co. v. United States3 6 and Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States,3 7 the court held that the Carvel trademark was not
33

1 d. at 515. For a discussion of the quality control defense, see note 22 supra.

" 332 F.2d at 519.

" Id.The Second Circuit has since viewed Carvel as holding that a "trademark qua
trademark" does not possess the requisite economic power to qualify for per se treatment.
Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir. 1974). At least one
other court has examined the authorities in the area and concluded that the degree of
prominence achieved by the mark is irrelevant in determining whether its use as a tying
product would constitute a per se violation in the trademark franchise situation. See Ungar v.
Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 93 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531
F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976), petitionfor cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3645 (U.S. Apr. 10, 1976) (No.
75-1636).
36 345 U.S. 594 (1953). For a discussion of the Times-Picayune holding, see note 27 supra.
37356 U.S. 1 (1958). For a discussion of Northern Pacific,see note 27 supra. Although the
majority correctly read Times-Picayune as requiring proof of market dominance with respect
to the tying product, that standard was eroded by Northern Pacific, a pre-Carvel case. In
Northern Pacific, the Supreme Court stated that notwithstanding the language in TimesPicayune, the reference therein to "monopoly power" or "dominance" requires nothing more
than a showing of "sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free
competition in the tied product ...." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11
(1958). Any other interpretation, stated the Court, would be wholly incompatible with the
policies underlying the Sherman Act. Id; accord, United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45
(1962).
The economic power sufficient to appreciably restrain competition does not require that
a defendant monopolize or even maintain a dominant position in the market. In the case of
tie-ins, "economic power over the tying product can be sufficient even though the power
fallsfar short of [market] dominance." Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1969) (emphasis added). See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38,
45 (1962). The Times-Picayune dominance criterion in the case of tie-ins was rejected because
of the fact that tie-ins generally serve no legitimate business purpose. Fortner Enterprises,
Inc., v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969). See also Aamco Automatic
Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 368 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Donlan v. Carvel,
209 F. Supp. 829, 833-34 (D. Md. 1962).
Based on the foregoing analysis, it seems clear that the standard of economic power
applied by the Carvel majority was rejected by Fortner,thus nullifying the Carvel rationale. See
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 n.7 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955
(1972); Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 365 F. Supp. 888, 892 (D. Conn. 1973),
affd on other ground5, 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Detroit City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski
Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453, 469-70 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
In Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second
Circuit, again faced with the question of the correct standard to apply in determining
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such a mark.3 8 It would appear, however, that the Second Circuit
implicitly ignored the less stringent standard of Northern Pacific in
giving heed to the prior Times-Picayune test, which required that the
seller have a monopolistic position in the market for the tying product.3 9

The majority's conclusion must be read in conjunction with its
holding concerning the second requirement for a tying arrangement to be deemed per se violative of the antitrust laws, i.e., that a
not insubstantial amount of commerce be affected. The court,
40
following the test indicated in Brown Shoe Co. v., United States,
found that an insubstantial amount of commerce was affected
where sales of "ingredients" other than mix amounted to over $1
million in the year 1960. Since the Carvel decision, the Supreme
Court has stated that a not insubstantial amount of commerce is
involved if the total amount of business foreclosed is substantial
enough in terms of a dollar volume inquiry so as not to be classified
4
as de minimis. 1
Judge Lumbard's analysis of the presumption in the case of
trademark tying was not tested again on the federal appellate level
until Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.4 1 In Chicken Delight, franchisees
brought a class action 4 3 against their franchisor, Chicken Delight,
"sufficient economic power," seemed to imply that the dominance requirement was still
viable. Id. at 664. Although noting that Fortner did dilute the market dominance criterion in
cases of tie-ins, the court did not define that standard. Id. at 664 n.4. At least one court,
believing that the market dominance criteria had been completely undercut by Fortner, has
criticised the Olsten decision. See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 94
n.24 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976), petitionfor cert.
filed, 44 U.S.LW. 3645 (U.S. Apr. 10, 1976) (No. 75-1636).
38332 F.2d at 519.
39
See note 37 supra.
40 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962). The Brown Shoe Court stated that a relatively small amount
of commerce must be affected by a challenged tying arrangement in comparison to other
types of antitrust violations. Id. The Carvel majority, following this lead, first considered that
out of 125,000 outlets where ice cream cones could be purchased, Carvel dealers numbered
only 250, about one-fifth of 1%. The court then noted that in 1960, sales of tied items to
Carvel dealers amounted to less than $1,360,000, an average of less than $3400 per dealer
per year. This was deemed to be a foreclosure of an inconsequential amount of commerce.
Subsequent to the Carvel ruling, however, the Supreme Court has held that it is error to
refer to the scope of any particular market or to the share of that market foreclosed in
determining whether a not insubstantial amount of commerce has been affected. Former
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1969) (holding the
foredosure of $200,000 annually is not insubstantial). See note 18 supra.
4 Former Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969),
discussed in notes 18 & 40 supra.
42 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
43 This action had previously been certified as a class action pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P.
23. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967), modified sub norn.
Chicken Delight, Inc. v. Harris, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969). From a strictly practical point
of view, a franchisor occupies in most, if not all cases, an economically dominant position
over any individual franchisee. See Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470, 477-78 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385
S. 1002 (1967); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 228-30 (1968);
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Inc., seeking treble damages 4 4 for antitrust violations resulting
from the use of Chicken Delight's standard form franchise contract. As a condition to obtaining the license to use the Chicken
Delight trademark, the franchise contract required that the franchisees purchase certain essential cooking equipment and dry-mix
food items from Chicken Delight. The district court entered a
directed verdict in favor of the franchisees, holding that the contractual requirements constituted a tying arrangement which was
per se violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
Chicken Delight argued that plaintiffs had failed to show that the
arrangement in question involved two distinct products, 45 the essential prerequisite to the existence of a tie-in. 4 6 Arguing that the
franchise, trademark license, packaging, mixes, and equipment
were all essential components of the franchise system, the defendant contended that only one product was involved. To determine
this issue, the court looked to whether the items were normally sold
Brown, Franchising, 174 N.Y.L.J. 5, July 8, 1975, at 2, col. 1. It is for this reason, together
with the fact that each individual franchisee's claim may be very minimal, see, e.g., Susser v.
Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519 n.2 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965), that
the class action has become an increasingly popular method in franchise litigation. Brown,
Franchising, 173 N.Y.L.J. 68, April 9, 1975, at 1, col. 1. See, e.g., Esposito v. Mister Softee,
Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1976-1 Trade Cas.) 60,887 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 1976); Hawkins v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,153 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
14 Treble damages, together with reasonable attorney's fees, are recoverable by any
person injured as a result of a violation of the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The
district courts are vested with jurisdiction regardless of the amount in controversy. Id. The
purpose of an award of treble damages is that it serves "as an incentive to encourage the
high purpose of enforcement of the antitrust laws." E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc.,
525 F.2d 296, 301 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1501 (1976).
45 448 F.2d at 47-48. This same argument was advanced by the defendants and rejected
by Judge Lumbard in the dissenting portion of his opinion in Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332
F.2d 505,514 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting in
part). Accord, Detroit City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453, 460-62
(E.D. Mich. 1975); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 89-90 (E.D. Pa.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976), petitionfor cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3645 (U.S. Apr. 10, 1976) (No. 75-1636); In re Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
20,441, at 20,341-42 (FTC 1973). Contra, Refrigeration Eng'r Corp. v. Frick Co., 370 F.
Supp. 702, 711 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Mid-America ICEE, Inc. v. John E. Mitchell Co., 1973-2
Trade Cas. 74,681, at 94,987 (D. Ore. 1973); In re 7-Eleven Franchise Antitrust Litigation,
75,429 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See also note 52 infra.
1974-2 Trade Cas.
46See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Compare Denison
Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962), with Dehydrating Process
Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961). In
Dehydrating Process, the defendant, influenced by customer complaints, adopted a policy of
not selling an unloader device, used in a silo, separate from the silo. The court recognized
that these two devices were two separate products, but held that articles, though physically
distinct, may be related through circumstances. "The sound business interests of the seller
or... a substantial hardship apart from the loss of the tie-in sale rhay be a circumstance." 292
F.2d at 655. In Denison Mattress, the court refused to find an illegal tie-in where a manufacturer was required to purchase supplies from sources designated by the defendant. It was
the opinion of the court that this agreement was necessary to allow the trademark owner to
control the nature and quality of the product. 308 F.2d at 410.
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or used as a unit4 7 and whether a trademark license and tied
products could rightfully be regarded as distinct items, capable of
48
being traded in distinct markets.

Historically, the trademark designated the source of the product to which the mark was attached. 49 Recent developments, however, have resulted in the adoption of the theory that trademarks
are merely representations of product quality. 50 This theory owes

'7

"[A]s a general rule, a manufacturer cannot be forced to deal in the minimum
product that could be sold or is usually sold. On the other hand, it is equally clear that one
cannot circumvent the anti-trust laws simply by claiming that he is selling a single product."
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Used in this context, a minimum product is a product stripped
to its bare minimum. For example, an automobile purchase involves the purchase of
many items, such as tires, batteries, seats, etc. It would, however, be absurd to compel an
automobile dealer to deal in a bare minimum, since such a requirement could result in sales of
automobiles without seats, tires, etc. Thus, the Chicken Delight court correctly looked for
normal business practices to determine the two-product requirement. See In re 7-Eleven
Franchise Antitrust Litigation, 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,429 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Beefy Trail,
Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 799,806 (M.D. Fla. 1972). In Beefy Trail, the court
held that the sale of a restaurant with restaurant equipment therein did not meet the
two-product test. Such a sale was considered analagous to the sale by an auto dealer of an
automobile stripped to its bare essentials. The court stated, however, that if it were shown
that the franchisor engaged in a course of conduct intended to circumvent the antitrust laws
by this arrangement, its decision might have been to the contrary. Id. at 807.
The seller's view of the arrangement may be of assistance to the courts in determining
whether a tie-in has occurred. For example, the seller's billing method, United States v.
Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S.
567 (1961), or his own purchase method, i.e., whether he purchases the products as distinct
items, Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125
(1965) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting in part), may tip the scale one way or the other.
41 The Chicken Delight defendants, in maintaining that the trademark and the product it
represented were not two distinct items, relied on United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus
Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918), wherein the Supreme Court stated that
[t]here is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to
an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed....
[I]ts function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader
and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his; and it is not
the subject of property except in connection with an existing business.
The Ninth Circuit, however, distinguished Rectanus by saying that the Court there did not
hold
that a mark and the product or business which it identifies are one and the same; it
meant simply that, unlike a copyright or a patent, a trade-mark does not confer
upon its owner the right to prohibit a competitor's use of the mark unless the owner
himself uses the mark in connection with an existing business.
448 F.2d at 48 n.2. See also United States v. Steffens (Trade-Mark Cases), 100 U.S. 82, 93-95
(1879).
49 Underlying this concept was the fundamental proposition that the trademark, by
identifying product source, enables the consumer to distinguish between competing goods.
"Since unmarked goods of varying quality frequently bear an exterior resemblance, the
trademark [permitted] . . . the consumer to purchase intelligently on the basis of prior
satisfaction." Quality Control, supra note 22, at 1174. See also Developments in the Law - Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARV. L. REv. 814, 816 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
50
See Developments, supra note 49, at 816-17, where it is noted that the consumer, as a
direct consequence of the impersonality of the marketing structure, thinks not of the
producer or the name of the firm, but rather of the product itself. "By constant repetition,
the mark is impressed on the consumer's mind," thus effecting an important advertising
function. Id. at 817. If the law were limited to protecting the trademarked goods on the
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its origin, in part, to the "burgeoning business of franchising."'5
The Chicken Delight franchise was not established to distribute the
marked goods of the franchisor, but rather to assure the buying
public a uniform standard of quality.5 2 Invoking the Supreme
Court's reasoning in International Salt Co. v. United States,5 3 United
"source" theory, it would also incidentally enhance the symbolic force of the mark with
respect to the advertising, appearance, appeal, and presumed quality of the goods in the eye
of the consumer. Id. See also Diggins, Trade-Marks and Restraints of Trade. 32 GEo. L.J. 113,
115 (1944).
The "product quality" theory of the function of trademarks has been termed the
"guaranty theory." Quality Control, supra note 22, at 1177. The guaranty theory has had far
reaching implications in the area of trademark licensing. Under the source theory, which
attempts to protect consumer expectation of product origin, licensing is permissible only
where the licensor actively participates in the preparation of the final product through the
supplying of an essential ingredient or service. In contrast, the guaranty theory removes the
need for sud active participation, substituting a quality control requirement. Thus, the
manufacturer of a brand-name product can license the trademark provided he has some
degree of control over the quality of the end product. Id.
51A good indication of the extent of the franchising business is found in Ungar v.
Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 109 n.38 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rei'd on other
grounds, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976),petitionforcert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3645 (U.S. Apr. 10,
1976) (No. 75-1636). The Ungar court, discussing figures released by the United States
Department of Commerce for the year 1972, observed that "franchised businesses in the
United States accounted for over $131 billion in annual sales in 1971, representing 35% of
retail sales and 13% of the Gross National Product. Published figures show that 1972 sales in
the fast-food franchising industry alone were $5.8 billion dollars." 68 F.R.D. at 109 n.38.
The projected number of franchised operations for 1976 is over 600,000. See note 19 supra.
See also Trademark Franchising,supra note 16, at 1086.
52 448 F.2d at 48-49. See note 50 supra. Compare Mid-America ICEE, Inc. v. John E.
Mitchell Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 174,681 (D. Ore. 1973), and Refrigeration Eng'r Corp. v.
Frick Co., 370 F. Supp. 702, 709-12 (W.D. Tex. 1974), with Detroit City Dairy, Inc. v.
Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Mich. 1975). In ICEE, the court stated that the
public probably did associate the trademark with a particular standard of quality rather than
with a particular source. 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,681, at 94,986. Nonetheless, the court
concluded that the trademark was a representation of product origin, not product quality.
Id., at 94,987. This was prompted by the fact that the defendant viewed its trademark as
representative of product origin rather than product quality, i.e., the defendant manufactured the machines producing the end product itself, and its business was not selling
trademarks or franchises, but rather manufacturing machines. Id. The Frick court termed
the sale of trademarks and/or franchises as the "rent-a-name" business, wherein the
trademark clearly is not a representation of product origin. 370 F. Supp. at 711. The
Kowalski court, in holding that the trademark in question was a representation of product
quality, and thus, could be a separate product, found that an illegal tie existed where receipt
of the trademark was conditioned on the purchase of products not manufactured by the
defendant, products for which the trademark could not be considered a symbol of origin.
When used for this purpose, a trademark can function as a tying product. Id. These three
cases suggest that where a trademark is affixed by a franchisor to products manufactured by
him, he is not in the "rent-a-name" business with respect to this use. It can be argued,
therefore, that the trademark is not separate and distinct from the product to which it is
affixed, and thus, cannot be a tying product. Absent an admission to the contrary, te
franchisor views his trademark as a representation of product origin. If, however, he seeks
to have a trademark affixed to products not manufactured by him, his trademark is merely
for hire, separate and distinct from the products to which it is affixed and capable of
functioning as a tying product. In this situation, his sole interest in the trademark with
respect to the public is to assure product quality. See generally Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d
1054 (1Oth Cir. 1975), rert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1508 (1976). See text accompanying notes 97-102
inJ la.
332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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States v. ParamountPictures, Inc.,

4

and United States v. Loew's Inc., 55

which held that the limited monopoly granted the holder of a
patent or copyright was not to be extended to tied products, 56 the
Chicken Delight court refused to extend the franchise trademark
protection to the individual tied products. Deception of the public
should not occur since it has no reason to connect "common articles," i.e. tied items such as napkins, cups, and spoons, with the
57
Chicken Delight trademark.
Regarding the presumption of sufficient economic power over
the tying product, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court
that "Chicken Delight's unique registered trade-mark, in combination with its demonstrated power to impose a tie-in, established as a
matter of law the existence of sufficient market power to bring the
case within the Sherman Act.158 Analogizing trademarks to patents
and copyrights, the court stated:
Just as the patent or copyright forecloses competitors from offering the distinctive product on the market, so the registered
trade-mark presents a legal barrier against competition. It is not
the nature of the public interest that has caused the legal barrier
to be erected that is the basis for the presumption, but the fact
that such a barrier does exist. Accordingly we see no reason why
the presumption that exists in the case of the patent and
copyright does not equally apply to the trade-mark. 59

Presented with a similar situation some 3 years later, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland
Refrigeration Corp., 60 hastened to adopt the Ninth Circuit's rationale
on the trademark presumption. More recently, various district
61
courts also have followed the Chicken Delight reasoning.
54334 U.S. 131 (1948).
5 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
"See text accompanying notes 103-08 infra.
57448 F.2d at 49.
"8 Id. Sufficient economic power over the tying product may be inferred from the
seller's de facto ability to impose a tie-in upon any appreciable number of buyers in the
market. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958); Advance Business Sys. & Supply
Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); Detroit
City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453, 467-70 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Aamco
Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 368 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Trademark Franchising,supra note 16, at 1107.
11448 F.2d at 50 (footnote omitted).
60463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972).
61See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 93 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976), petitonfor cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3645 (U.S.
Apr. 10, 1976) (No. 75-1636); Detroit City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp.
453, 471 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,153 (W.D.
Tenn. 1975); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,390 (D. Utah 1974), rev'd, 524
F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 1508 (1976); Aamco Automatic Transmis-
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When the Second Circuit was later given the opportunity to
overrule Carvel, in Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp.,6 2 and
thereby conform to the decisions of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, it
refused to do so. Olsten involved a suit by a franchisee under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Engaged in the business of supplying
temporary personnel, 63 Olsten supplied white-collar office personnel under the name and registered trademark of Olsten and bluecollar workers under the name and registered trademark of Handy
Andy Labor.6 4 Plaintiffs alleged that in order to procure the license
for the white-collar personnel service, a franchisee was required to
establish and operate a blue-collar service under the Handy Andy
Labor trademark. The tying product, plaintiffs claimed, was the
white-collar franchise, while the tied product was the blue-collar
franchise. On the issue of the presumption of economic power, the
plaintiffs argued that the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Chicken
Delight and of the Fifth Circuit in Warriner Hermetics should be
adopted by the Second Circuit. In refusing to do so, the Olsten
court viewed the essence of a trademark as merely a means of
identifying the franchisor. 6 5 Surely, said the court, there was nothing so unique in the techniques or method of operation of Olsten
that the same services could not be offered by others. 66 Quoting
from the Supreme Court's 1918 decision in United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co., 67 the Second Circuit concluded that "there is
no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appursions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 368 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Falls Church Bratwursthaus, Inc. v.
Bratwursthaus Management Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (E.D. Va. 1973). See also
Mid-America ICEE, Inc. v. John E. Mitchell Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,681, at 94,986 (D.
Ore. 1973). Contra, Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1976-1 Trade Cas.)
60,786 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1976).
62 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974).
63 Such business is a "service" and therefore is not subject to § 3 of the Clayton Act. Id. at
661 n. I. See note 31 supra.
64 506 F.2d at 660.

65Id at 663.
66
Id. Others could offer services identical to Olsten's provided they did not represent or
pass them off to be "Olsten" services. Cf. United States v. Steffens (Trade-Mark Cases), 100
U.S. 82 (1879). The court misses this crucial distinction. Olsten services evoke from former
clients the recollection of previous satisfactory experiences in hiring office personnel, and
give them a basis for making an informed choice in the future. From the franchisee's point
of view, this benefit will be reaped whether the client has used personnel from his particular
franchise operation or from another's, as long as it was an Olsten franchisee. Thus, in his
"sales pitch," the Olsten franchisee takes advantage of the good name of the Olsten system as
well as the benefits flowing from its advertising. See generally Diggins, Trade-Marks and
Restraints of Trade, 32 GEO. L.J. 113, 114-16 (1944). This point was recognized by the Carrel
majority, though in a somewhat narrower form: "The true tying item was rather the Carvel
trademark, whose growing repute was intended to help the little band of Carvel dealers
swim a bit faster than their numerous rivals up the highly competitive stream." Susser v.
Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
67 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
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tenant to an established business or trade .... ,,68 Moreover, no
Supreme Court decision has gone any further than to presume
economic power of the defendant where the tying product was
patented or copyrighted.69
The conflict among the circuits on this issue is likely to encourage forum shopping, especially in the context of trademark
franchising. 70 By limiting the tying arrangement to the confines of
the Second Circuit, a franchisor's imposition of such requirements
may well pass judicial scrutiny if that circuit continues to follow its
reasoning as to the significance of a trademark in a tie-in situa7
tion. 1
CONSIDERATIONS IN TRADEMARK TYING CASES

The Source and Guaranty Theories of Trademarks- The Two Product Test
The Chicken Delight court set forth a far-reaching concept when
it stated that the historical conception of a trademark as simply
68

(1918).

506 F.2d at 663, quoting United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97

69 506 F.2d at 663. The court also stated that Carvel, Chicken Delight, and Warriner
Hermetics involved questions of market dominance in the tying product. These were traditional
tying situations said the court, the only difference being that the Camel majority failed to
find that the trademark "had the requisite [economic] leverage." Id. Perhaps the reason why
the court did not go on to say that Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495 (1969) overruled Carrel vis-i-vis the relevant standard of economic power in the
tying product, see notes 35 & 37 supra, is that Olsten is replete with references to "market
dominance," as was the Carvel majority opinion. See, e.g., 506 F.2d at 664, 668. One district
court has recognized that Olsten misapplied Fortner. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America,
Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 94 n.24 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.
1976),petitionforcert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3645 (U.S. Apr. 10, 1976) (No. 75-1636). The Olsten
view is difficult to reconcile with Fortner since the Olsten court itself acknowledged "that
Fortner
further diluted the market dominance criterion for tying." 506 F.2d at 664 n.4.
7
0 Brown, Franchising, 173 N.Y.L.J. 29, Feb. 11, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
71 It is possible to distinguish Olsten in two ways. First, if plaintiffs action challenges a
"typical" franchisor-franchisee tying arrangement where the tied items are commodities for
which the franchisor does not possess a trademark, the plaintiff can argue that the defendant franchisor is seeking to extend the protection of his trademark to items for which he
has not been granted the use of the mark. Second, plaintiff might be able to prove, by the
use of pretrial discovery, that defendant views his trademark as a "representation of product
quality" rather than of "product origin." Recent district court cases have discussed this latter
approach, holding that where a franchisor opts for the former definition of his trademark,
the mark is found to be a product separate and distinct from items tied to it. See note 52
supra. This was the first stumbling block faced by the Olsten court. Since it did not find that
the Olsten trademark was a separate product, the two-product condition to finding a tying
arrangement was not present. 506 F.2d at 665-66. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
However, if the defendant sells trademarks en masse synbolizing his business and method of
operation, a court should have no hesitancy in finding the trademark capable of being a
tying product. See note 52 supra. It might then be urged that the Olsten court, in refusing to
find the requisite economic power in the trademark, did not consider the case before it to be
a "well-recognized and customary tying situation" of the franchisor-franchisee relationship.
But see Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1976-1 Trade Cas.)
60,786
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1976), wherein the court, relying on Olsten, refused to presume sufficient
economic power with respect to the trademark even though the case presented a "wellrecognized and customary tying situation" in the franchisor-franchisee relationship.
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identifying the source of the product to which it is attached 7 2 has
largely been abandoned in favor of a new rationale,7 3 the guaranty
theory,7 4 which views a trademark as a representation of product
quality. The belief that a trademark represents the source or origin
of the product to which it is affixed developed because of the
confinement of distribution to local areas. In such a system, consumers were able to learn of, and rely upon, the identity of the
producer of the goods. 75 With the shift of the economy to a more
complex system of distribution, due in no small part, as pointed out
76
in Chicken Delight, to the "burgeoning business of franchising,
trademarks can no longer realistically be used to identify the physical source from which the product originates.77 The average consumer, seeing a mark on certain products, thinks not of the identity
of their maker, but of his previous experiences together with
favorable or unfavorable recommendations about products sold
under that mark. If the consumer's previous experience with the
product has been favorable, the trademark will be an asset to its
owner.78 The trademark represents to the consumer not what the
product is, but what it is reputed to be. The mark conveys a
generalized idea of a standard of quality which the product is
expected to meet. Thus, the appeal of a familiar brand may prevail
in a consumer's choice irrespective of the comparative merit of the
product. Additionally, the trademark owner's advertisements of
product quality influence the consumer in the selecting process.
From an antitrust perspective, where a trademark is used to
effectuate a tie-in, the court's conclusion as to which theory of
trademarks is applicable may be an extremely crucial factor. Two
recent district court cases highlight this distinction.7 9 In MidAmerica ICEE, Inc. v. John E. Mitchell Co., 80 a private antitrust action
seeking treble damages and injunctive relief, plaintiffs alleged that
defendants imposed illegal tie-ins in violation of section 3 of the
Clayton Act. Defendant Mitchell was the sole manufacturer of
machines which produced a certain carbonated beverage. Mitchell
72 Quality Control, supra note 22, at 1174.

448 F.2d at 48.
74Quality Control, supra note 22, at 1177.
75
Developmnents, supra note 49, at 816-17.
76448 F.2d at 48.
77
Id. at 48-49; cf. Developments, supra note 49, at 817; Quality Conthol. supra note 22, at
1174.
78 CJ. Developnents, supra note 49, at 817.
79
See Detroit City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Mich.
1975); Mid-America ICEE, Inc. v. John E. Mitchell Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,681 (D. Ore.
1973).
80 1973-2 Trade Cas.
74,681 (D. Ore. 1973).
73
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also owned the ICEE trademark attached to both the carbonated
beverage product and the machine which produced it. Plaintiffs
were individuals and corporations who had purchased franchises
from regional agents of Mitchell. These franchises gave plaintiffs
the right to lease the ICEE machines and to place them in profitable locations in exclusive territories defined by each franchise. As
the IGEE enterprise became more successful and well known,
competitors of Mitchell began to make and market similar machines. The franchisees desired to buy competing machines and yet
continue to use the ICEE trademark. Mitchell did not prevent the
franchisees from using competing machines; it did, however, forbid plaintiffs from applying the ICEE trademark to anything other
than its own machines and the drink dispensed by them.
By its very definition, the existence of a tying arrangement
requires the involvement of two distinct products, both a tying and
a tied product.8 ' Thus, although the practice of the defendants was
couched in terms of a negative condition, i.e., if you buy products
elsewhere, you may not operate under the trademark,8 2 the facts
would seem to present a classic tying arrangement. Nonetheless,
the ICEE court held that the two product requirement was not met.
The issue presented to the court was: When does a trademark
acquire sufficient substance in its own right to warrant treatment of
it as an entity separate and apart from the object it identifies?
While the court held that the ICEE trademark and machine were
not separate products, it did acknowledge that the public most
likely associated the ICEE name more with a particular kind of
drink than with the machines produced by Mitchell.8 3 Even the
defendant recognized a conceptual distinction between the machine and trademark, as evidenced by the fact that it licensed the
trademark and the machines in separate clauses in the franchise
contract. 8 4 The court pointed out, however, that Mitchell manufactured the machines itself, and its business was the sale of machines,
8' See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
52 1973-2 Trade Gas. %74,681, at 94,986.
11Id. In Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1508
(1976), plaintiff operated as a jobber for Shell gasoline, selling at wholesale prices products
purchased from Shell. When plaintiff's jobber contract was terminated by Shell, suit was
brought charging Shell with illegally tying the use of its trademark to the purchase of Shell
products. The jobber contract stated that plaintiff had a right to sell products purchased
from defendant Shell under the Shell trademark. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff,
the court held that the jobber contract did not create a franchise relationship, and that
because of the fact that plaintiff had the right as opposed to the obligation to sell gasoline as
Shell gasoline, "the trademark could be a representation, if plaintiff wanted to make it, that
the gasoline was Shell gasoline and thus either made by or for Shell." Id. at 1056-57
(emphasis added).
"4 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,681 at 94,987.
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not the sale of trademarks or franchises.8 5 Notwithstanding the fact
that the public viewed the ICEE trademark as a representation of
product quality, Mitchell treated its mark as a representation of
product origin . 6 Declaring that this position was reasonable and
should not be disturbed, the court held that the two product test
was not satisfied.
The franchise contract also contained, however, a clause requiring plaintiffs to purchase cups for the ICEE machines from
sources designated by the defendant.8 7 The court found that this
requirement established an illegal tie.88 In determining whether
there existed sufficient economic power over the tying product to
appreciably restrain free competition in the tied product, the court
ICEE
held that the trademark, together with patents covering 8the
9
power.
requisite
the
of
existence
the
indicated
machine,
In contrast to the ICEE holding is Detroit City Dairy, Inc. v.
Kowalski Sausage Co. 90 The Kowalski plaintiff brought an action
under section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton
Act alleging that defendant engaged in an illegal tying arrangement with certain of its retailers. Plaintiff was a wholesale distributor of dairy, meat, and other food products. Defendant, a
manufacturer of meat products, sold its own products and those of
other manufacturers, known as "resale items," to retail customers
and outlets. The franchised retail outlets were provided with a
neon sign bearing the Kowalski name and trademark.9 " Plaintiff
contended that defendant tied the resale items to both the license
to sell the Kowalski manufactured products and the retailer's right
85 ld.; accord, Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 1508 (1976).
86 1973-2 Trade Cas. $74,681 at 94,987.
87
Id.
88

I&
89 Id. For this proposition, the court relied on Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States

Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1969). That portion of Fortner referred to by the ICEE
court stated that "the economic power over the tying product can be sufficient even though
Id. Instead of relying on the traditional patent
the power falls far short of dominance ....
and copyright tying cases, see text accompanying notes 103-11 infra, the ICEE court felt
comfortable in applying the Fortner approach as to the unique attributes of a patent and

trademark vis-i-vis the standard of economic power. Similarly, in Esposito v. Mister Softee,
Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1976-1 Trade Cas.) $60,786 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1976), the court
looked to Fortner for the proposition that the requisite economic power over the tying

product is presumed where the product is patented or copyrighted. Id., at 68,407, citing 394
U.S. 495, 505 n.2 (1969). See generally text accompanying notes 125-126 infra.
90393 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
SI

Although the neon sign which carried the Kowalski trademark and evidenced the

franchise status was a valuable asset from an advertising standpoint, the court noted "that

the tying product in this case is essentially a trademark," and that the sign bearing the
Kowalski name represented a de facto license of the Kowalski trademark. Id. at 470. As a
trademark, the court found the tying product to be unique. Id.
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to keep his neon sign and franchise status. Following the same
analytical procedure as did the ICEE court, the Kowalski court first
applied the two product test. Clearly the Kowalski manufactured
products were capable of being tying products. Theoretically, the
neon sign, representing the Kowalski trademark, also could be
considered a tying product, because "the sign is important, if at all,
not because it is worth $75, but because it carries the Kowalski
trademark and evidences the franchise status." 9 2
The court's examination of the ICEE decision provided guidance. In ICEE, the ICEE trademark was actually attached to the
machine which had been manufactured and distributed by the
defendant. Thus, notwithstanding public opinion as to the nature
of the ICEE trademark, the product origin interpretation put forth
by the defendant was reasonable. 93 In Kowalski, plaintiff did not
challenge the practice of conditioning receipt of the Kowalski
trademark on the purchase of Kowalski manufactured products to
which the trademark was affixed. Rather, the contention was that
the receipt of the sign, in essence the trademark, was conditioned
on the purchase of products not manufactured by Kowalski. These
products, the resale items, were products for which the trademark
could not be considered a symbol of origin. The conclusion
reached by the court was that a trademark can be viewed as a tying
product when it is used to tie products not manufactured by its
owner. 9 4 Turning to the issue of economic power, the Kowalski
court stated that, based on the record before it,95 the goodwill and
92 ld at 459.

"See generally Refrigeration Eng'r Corp. v. Frick Co., 370 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Tex.
1974). In Frick, plaintiff, who was in the business of servicing refrigeration systems, brought
suit against defendant, a major domestic manufacturer of refrigeration equipment, for
alleged illegal tie-ins. Plaintiffs contention that defendant's trademark was a tying product
was rejected by the court because it was not separate from or sold separately from defendant's products. Id. at 711. The court made it clear that only certain specific trademarks,
those trademarks which represent product quality, may be considered separate products.
94 393 F. Supp. at 453; accord, Refrigeration Eng'r Corp. v. Frick Co., 370 F. Supp. 702,
711 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
0' Although appellate courts passing on the issue of a trademark presumption have
examined the record before them to determine the economic power of the specific mark,
their holdings are actually applicable to all trademarks. For example, in Carvel, Judge
Lumbard, in his dissent, stated that sufficient economic power could be presumed from the
Carvel trademark; he could "find no reason not to extend this presumption of economic
power to trademarks." 332 F.2d at 513. A further examination of the record concerning the
Carvel mark sustained his finding on the facts before him. Id. The majority of the Can'el
panel, however, while conceding that there may be some instances where the trademark has
attained such a degree of prominence that sufficiency of economic.power should be presumed, stated that the Carvel mark, based on the record, was not such a mark. Id. at 519. See
notes 35 & 37 supra. Thus, the majority accepted the proposition that in some cases a
trademark could possess the requisite economic power. In Olsten, the court interpreted
Carrelas precluding application of the presumption to a trademark, stating that "this circuit
has already held that a trademark qua trademark is not a sufficient indication of dominance
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public acceptance embodied in the trademark was sufficient to
support a finding that the defendant possessed the economic
96
power necessary to constitute a per se violation.
The rule which emerges from the ICEE and Kowalski cases
would qualify the statement made by the Chicken Delight court that
the trademark as a strict emblem of the source of a product to
which it is attached has largely been replaced by the guaranty
theory in the context of franchising. 9 7 If a seller himself manufactures a product to which his mark is affixed, and competitors in the
field are in some mahner prevented from producing such a product, the trademark will, over a period of time, attain the characteristic of a mark representative of product origin. Then, not
withstanding the fact that the public may not view the seller's mark
as such, the seller's theory of product origin will be sustained as
reasonable. The two product test will not be satisfied because the
mark and the product are indistinguishable. Hence, by definition,
the arrangement cannot be a tie-in.9 But if a seller affixes his mark
to goods not in the first instance produced by him, with the attendant curtailment of competition, then his mark is merely one of
over the tying product to qualify for per se treatment under the Northern Pacific rubric." 506
F.2d at 663. Notwithstanding this statement, the Olsten court proceeded to examine the
record concerning the Olsten mark, and with its finding that the franchise which the mark
represented was no more attractive, unique, desirable, or effective than any other, the court
reinforced its holding that a trademark could not warrant the presumption of the requisite
economic power. Id.
In Chicken Delight, which involved a distinctly desirable and powerful mark, the court did
not limit its holding, but broadly declared that the presumption which exists in the case of
the patent and copyright should be equally applied to all trademarks. 448 F.2d at 50.
Similarly, it was only after the Warriner Hermetics court concluded that the presumption
should be extended to cases of trademarks in general that it examined the record and found
that defendant was one of the most powerful members in the market. 463 F.2d at 1015.
A number of district courts, confronted with motions for summary judgment and faced
with a bare record, have reached their decision on the basis of whether or not to invoke the
presumption in the case of trademarks in general, not simply on the basis of the mark before
them. See Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 5 TRADE RE;. REP. (1976-1 Trade Cas.) 60,786
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1976); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 93 (E.D.
Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3645 (U.S. Apr. 10, 1976) (No. 75-1636). In Ungar, the court noted, however, that
the Dunkin' Donuts trademark would, at a trial on the merits, emerge as far more distinctive
than the Olsten trademark. 68 F.R.D. at 94 n. 24. In Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 1975-1
Trade Cas.
60,153 (W.D. Tenn. 1975), and Falls Church Bratwursthaus, Inc. v. Bratwursthaus Management Corp., 368 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (E.D. Va. 1973), the courts went so
far as to state that in considering the applicability of the presumption, a trademark should be
treated like a patent or copyright. Cf. In re Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 3 TRADE RE;. REP.
20,441, at 20,340-41 (FTC 1973) (the patent and copyright presumption should be extended
to the case of a trademark); Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 368 F. Supp.
1283, 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
'6 393 F. Stipp. at 471.
17 448 F.2d at 48. For a discussion of the source and guaranty theories, see text
accompanying notes 72-78 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
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product quality, a guaranty to the public of a certain standard.
Here the trademark is in fact separately marketable and defined
apart from the goods to which it may be affixed. In this instance, a
trademark may be a tying product. Logically, it should make no
difference that the seller views his mark as one of product origin;
such a view should be held unreasonable.
It is noteworthy that the franchise arrangement will almost
always be placed in this second category. 9 9 The typical franchisor
licenses his trademarks en masse. In reality, the franchisor is in what
one court has termed the "rent-a-name" business.1 0 0 It is only
where the appurtenant products to the franchised trademark are
not amenable to reasonable specification,' 0 ' or where a trade secret1 0 2 is involved, that the franchisor may be justified in requiring
99 Although the Olsten decision involved a franchise arrangement, the Second Circuit
did not consider it a "customary" tying situation such as those in Carvel, Chicken Delight, and
WarrinerHermetics. 506 F.2d at 664. Apparently, the Olsten court felt that the normal tying
situation involves the forced purchase of commodities as tied products not sufficiently connected to the trademark. This is highlighted by the court's statement that "it has never been
held that the sale of two trademarked, copyrighted, or even patented commodities, without
more, constitutes a tying arrangement." Id. at 663. Thus, the court concluded, since the tied
"product" was trademarked, as was the blue-collar franchise, the arrangement fell outside
the realm of the customary tying situation because it did not involve the purchase of a
commodity as a tied product to which the trademark could not reasonably be expected to
relate. Id. at 663-64. But ef. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (two copyrighted products can be involved in a tie-in).
100 Refrigeration Eng'r Corp. v. Frick Co., 370 F. Supp. 702, 711 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
101

See note 22 supra.

102 "The

'trade secret' has been defined many times with varying degrees of precision."
M. FINNEGAN & R. GOLDSCHEIDER, CURRENT TRENDS IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
LICENSING 181 (PLI 1976). The most widely recognized definition is that given by the
Restatement of Torts:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). To be protected by the obligation of

secrecy, trade practices must be in fact secret. Although a trade secret is not subject to the
rigorous preconditions required for patentability, viz., novelty, invention, and nonobviousness, it must at least amount to some type of discovery. Matters generally known or easily
discernible cannot be trade secrets. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp.
250, 257-59 (S.D. Cal. 1958), affd per curiam, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960). The Supreme
Court has praised protection of trade secrets because it "promotes the sharing of knowledge,
and the efficient operation of industry ..
" Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
493 (1974). It has been suggested, however, that despite the existence of a genuine trade
secret, the courts should be extremely wary of tolerating abuses in the franchise situation. See
FrandiseMisuse, supra note 11, at 1156, wherein it is noted that while patents are subject to
the scrutiny of the patent office and are limited in duration, trade secrets are not subject to
review and are perpetual provided they remain confidential. The trade secret defense was
recognized by the Chicken Delight court as a possible justification for refusing to provide
specifications for tied products. 448 F.2d at 51 n.9. The Federal Trade Commission has
suggested, however, that a balance must be struck between preventing the divulgence of
trade secrets and the countervailing policies of the antitrust laws, i.e., the encouragement of
unrestrained tradc. Consequently, the better view is thought to be that sellers who own trade
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that the appurtenant items be obtained from the franchisor or
from suppliers designated by him.
THE PATENT AND COPYRIGHT PRESUMPTION

A

-

COMPARISON TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
TRADEMARK CHARACTERISTICS

The presumption of sufficient economic power where the
tying item is patented or copyrighted evolved from three Supreme
10 3
Court decisions. The first, InternationalSalt Co. v. United States,
involved a civil action brought by the United States to enjoin
International Salt from carrying out certain provisions of its
equipment leases. International Salt owned patents on two machines that were designed to be used with salt products. One
machine, the "Lixator," dissolved rock salt into a brine that was
used in various industrial processes. The other machine, the "Saltomat," injected salt in tablet form into canned products during the
canning process. International Salt's leases required that the lessees
purchase from International Salt all unpatented salt products to be
used in the patented machines. In affirming the granting of the
Government's motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court
held this practice illegal. The Court acknowledged that the patents
did confer a limited monopoly, but felt that the monopoly did not
extend to the unpatented salt products.1 0 4 As a result of this illegal
secrets should be compelled to provide specifications to manufacturers designated by the
buyer even if the specifications are trade secrets. The seller, of course, is protected by
"appropriate legal remedies in the event of disclosure of alleged secrets by such manufacturers." In re Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. T 20,441, at 20,347 (FTC 1973);
accord, Franchise Misuse, supra note 11, at 1156.
103332 U.S. 392 (1947).
"04 Id. at 395-96. Pursuant to the limited monopoly which International Salt possessed by
virtue of its patents, it was legally permitted to prevent others from making, vending, or
using the machines. This restraint on competition was judicially enforceable via a suit for
patent infringement. However, the patents conferred no monopoly on the unpatented salt
products. Hence, there was no legal sanction for restraining trade in the market for
International Salt's unpatented products. InternationalSalt also provided a good example of a
disguised tie-in. The leases provided that if any competitor offered salt products of an equal
grade, the lessee was permitted to buy competing products in the open market unless the
lessor could furnish the salt at an equivalent price. The Court rejected the contention that
this provision transformed the lease into a reasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 396-97.
In addition, International Salt contended that, since it was under an obligation in each
lease to repair and maintain the machines, precluding the use of competing salt products in
its machines was reasonable. The lessor claimed that the high quality of its own salt products
assured satisfactory machine operation and lower maintenance costs. In United States v.
Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567
(1961), a similar defense was held viable in the limited circumstances where the tie-in is used
in a new industry and competitors do not possess the requisite experience in the tied
products to be able to ensure that they would function adequately. The court found that
permitting outside concerns to provide the tied products was likely to result in nascent
failures and the destruction of the new industry. 187 F. Supp. at 557. As the technology of
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tying lease, the lessor tended to foreclose competition in the market
for the salt products by an unwarranted extension of its limited
patent monopoly.
In United States v. ParamountPictures, Inc., 10 5 the Government
brought suit alleging, in part, that the practice of block-booking by
the defendants violated the antitrust laws. Block-booking is the
practice of licensing or offering a desirable feature film or group
thereof on the condition that the exhibitor also accept a licensing
agreement for another, less desirable feature or group released by
the distributors. 10 6 For example, in order to show desirable films
such as "Sergeant York" and "Treasure of Sierra Madre," the
exhibitor would have to agree to take undesirable films such as
"Gorilla Man" and "Tugboat Annie Sails Again."1' 0 7 In the
Paramount case, both the desirable and the undesirable films were
copyrighted. The Court held the arrangement illegal, reasoning
that were it to be condoned, the tie-in would allow the tied product,
the inferior film, to draw on the quality of the tying product, the
superior film, thus expanding the monopoly created by the
10 8
copyright beyond the limited purpose intended by Congress.
The full import of InternationalSalt and Paramountwas demonstrated in United States v. Loew's Inc.,' 0 9 another block-booking case.
Relying on both InternationalSalt and Paramoz~nt, the Court found
the Loew's block-booking practice to be illegal. Discussing the measure of power that the seller must have in the tying product, the
Court acknowledged that the Northern Pacific standard of " 'suffident economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product
....
'" was the correct point of focus. 1 10 The Court held that
this standard is to be presumed when the tying product is patented
or copyrighted.1 '
In addition to crystallizing the presumption doctrine with respect to patents and copyrights, the Loew's Court introduced a new
concept into the requisite standard for finding sufficient economic
power by declaring that the power "may be inferred from the tying
the new industry matures and becomes more amenable to specification, however, the persuasiveness of this defense begins to ebb. Id. at 558. See generally Note, Newcomer Defenses:
Reasonable Use of Tie-ins, Franchises,Territorials,and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. REV. 457 (1966).
103334 U.S. 131 (1948).
'"Id. at 156.
17
" See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1962).
103 334 U.S. at 158.
109 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
hId at 45, quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958), discussed in
note 27 supra.
"1 371 U.S. at 45.
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product's desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes."'1 2 The Court stated that since either uniqueness or consumer appeal can demonstrate the requisite market power, "it
should seldom be necessary in a tie-in sale case to embark upon a
full-scale factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant market for
the tying product and into the corollary problem of the seller's
percentage share in that market,"'1 13 particularly when the tying
product is patented or copyrighted. 11 4 The Court did acknowledge,
however, that although it was difficult to conceive of such cases,
is inapplicable in
there might be instances where the presumption
115
cases involving patents and/or copyrights.
A reading of Loew's in fight of the Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncement in this area suggests that the presumption
of sufficient economic power will exist not only where the tying
product is a patented or copyrighted item, but also where it is
unique and there is a legal or practical barrier to competition with
respect to that product. In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp.," 6 an action seeking treble damages for violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, plaintiff Fortner charged that United
States Steel and its wholly owned subsidiary, United States Steel
Home Credit Corporation, had violated the Sherman Act in the
sale of prefabricated housing. Plaintiffs complaint charged that in
order to obtain loans for the purchase and development of certain
land in Louisville, Kentucky, plaintiff had been required to agree
to erect a prefabricated house manufactured by United States Steel
on each lot purchased.with the loan proceeds. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that plaintiff failed to raise any question of fact as to a violation of the
antitrust laws. '" 7 Despite the district court's conclusion that the
112Id.
S113
Id. at 45 n.4. When the "statutorily dispensed" monopoly of the patent and copyright
comes into conflict with the statutory principles of free competition, enlargement of the
scope of the patent or copyright monopoly via tying arrangements must be strictly confined.
lId at 49.
In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), a credit
offering was sufficiently unique to possess the requisite economic power necessary to constitute a per se violation. The court noted that uniqueness can confer economic power upon
the party offering the distinctive product only when competitors are in some way prevented
from offering it themselves. These barriers may be legal, as in the case of patents and
copyrights, or economic, as where competitors simply cannot produce the distinctive product
profitably. Id. at 505 n.2. See text accompanying notes 121-23 infra.
I 4 371 U.S. at 45 n.4; see Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 505 n.2. (1969).
"'371 U.S. at 49-50.
116 293 F. Supp. 762 (W.D. Ky. 1966), aff'd mem., 404 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394

U.S. 495 (1969).
"7293 F. Supp. at 769.
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agreement in question was a tie-in, with the credit terms being the
tying product and the prefabricated houses the tied product, it was
the opinion of the court that Fortner had failed to establish the
prerequisites of per se illegality, i.e., sufficient market power over
the tying product 1n 8 and a foreclosure of the requisite amount of
commerce in the tied product market,
The Supreme Court reversed. Finding that the district court
had applied an erroneous standard in weighing the necessary
amount of commerce to be foreclosed, 119 the Court stated that the
proper inquiry was whether more than a de minimis amount of
commerce was foreclosed by the tie-in.' 20 Turning then to the
question of sufficient economic power in the tying product, the
Court looked with approval to the Loew's decision, wherein it was
stated that the crucial economic power of the tying product may be
inferred from its desirability to consumers or from the uniqueness
of its attributes.' 2' The basis for this standard lies in the recognition that tying arrangements generally serve no legitimate purpose,
and thus, the presence of any appreciable restraint on competition
provides a sufficient reason for declaring the tie illegal. The Court
declared that such an appreciable restraint is present "whenever
the seller can exert some power over some of the buyers in the
market, even if his power is not complete over them and over all
other buyers in the market."' 22 The test set forth was "whether the
seller has the power to raise prices, or impose other burdensome
terms such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of
23
buyers within the market."'
Contending that the financing made available by defendant
was unique in the credit market, the plaintiff argued that the
requisite economic power could be inferred from the unique terms
which set apart defendant's credit terms from those of its competitors.' 24 Elaborating on the Loew's decision, the Court stated that
"8Id. at 767-69; see note 27 supra.
119 394 U.S. at 501-02. The Court reaffirmed the principle, which had been mis-

construed by the district court, that the Northern Pacific standards must be met only to prove
a per se violation. Id. at 499-500. If plaintiff cannot meet the burden of proof on the per se
theory, summary judgment for defendant is improper because plaintiff may still be able to
establish a violation using the rule of reason test whereby "inquiry is made under the general
standards of the Sherman Act with a thorough examination into the purposes and effects of
the practices involved." Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 n.18 (E.D. Pa.
1975). To be successful in this regard, plaintiff must prove an unreasonable restraint of
competition. Id see note 16 supra.
120 394 U.S. at 501; see note 18 supra.
121 394 U.S. at 503.
1221Id But see Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443, 449 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
123 394 U.S. at 504.
124 Id at 504-05.
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uniqueness gives rise to sufficient economic power over the tying
product only when competitors are in some way foreclosed from
offering the distinctive product themselves. 1 25 In the case of patented or copyrighted tying products, the barrier is a legal one. The
Court recognized, however, that despite the absence of a legal
obstacle preventing competitors from offering a product, an economic barrier may exist if the product cannot be offered profit26
ably.'
Hence, the concepts of uniqueness and consumer appeal introduced in Loew's must be viewed in light of Fortner's elaboration
of these ideas plus its own notion of a legal or practical barrier
imposed upon competitors, foreclosing their ability to compete on
an equal basis. Consequently, the definition of "market" must take
into consideration both "buyers" and "competitors," within the
market. Reading Loew's and Fortner together, one can derive the
following test: an appreciable restraint on competition 27 results
when the seller can impose a tying arrangement with respect to any
appreciable number of buyers in the market where the tying product is unique and competitors are foreclosed from offering the
same product. This Loew's-Fortner test lends itself particularly well
to the analysis of a trademark. A trademark is clearly unique since
its owner can prevent any unauthorized person from using his
mark. 1 2 8 Moreover, a mark may not be filed on the principal
12 5 1. at 505 n.2.
12 6
Id. On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Supreme
Coures decision in Fortner made it clear that evidence of the economic barrier coupled with a
showing of uniqueness provided a less stringent standard for demonstrating that competitors are in some way prevented from offering the product. Thus, a plaintiff relying on
these factors could introduce evidence of noncompetitive higher prices in the tied-product
market, or evidence of the number of buyers accepting the tie-in as tending to prove the
economic barrier. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 523 F.2d 961 (6th
Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1100 (1976). By recognizing the economic barrier, the
Court has reflected a clear trend, one of "a steady diminution in the strictness of proof
required to establish the economic power requisite of an unlawful tie." Ungar v. Dunkin'
Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 93 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d
1211 (3d Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3645 (U.S. Apr. 10, 1976) (No.
75-1636).
127 In further explaining the type of question to be asked in determining whether a
seller has such power, the Fortner Court specifically noted that one of the inquiries is whether
the seller has the power to impose unilaterally burdensome terms, "such as a tie-in," over any
appreciable number of buyers. 394 U.S. at 504. Clearly, in the context of trademark
franchising, the relevant buyers are the franchisees. See text accompanying note 131 infra.
128 The owner of the mark may secure an injunction in the following situations:
(a) Where an infringer is engaged solely in the business of printing the mark for
others and establishes that he was an innocent infringer the owner of the right
infringed shall be entitled . . . only to an injunction against future printing; (b)
where the infringement complained of is contained in or is part of paid advertising
matter ... the remedies of the owner of the right infringed ... shall be confined to
an injunction against the presentation of such advertising matter in future issues ....
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (1970). In all other situations, i.e., a knowing infringement, an injunction
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register if it conflicts with a previously filed mark.1 2 9 A trademark
owner would be the first to contend that his mark is one of a kind,
thus satisfying the uniqueness test of Loew's. The barrierforeclosure requirement of Fortner is also satisfied in that
trademark infringement sanctions are intended to do just that;
competitors are foreclosed from offering a trademarked product
13 0
or the license of a trademark without the consent of the owner.
The next step in this analysis is to define the market' 3 ' and
decide whether the seller has the power to impose tie-ins with
respect to any appreciable number of buyers therein. In the usual
franchise tie-in case, where a seller is on the wholesale rent-a-name
level and does not sell directly to the public, the market is limited.
The buyers are the present and prospective franchisees and the
market is the market for those goods the franchise is established to
distribute. The more narrowly the market is defined, the fewer will
be the number of buyers therein. Thus, the "appreciable" number
of buyers who must be found to be operating under the tie-in will
decrease. In Carvel, the market was that for freshly made soft ice
cream franchises, in Chicken Delight for "take-out" chicken franchises, and in Olsten, for white-collar temporary personnel franchises.
Thus, proof of tie-ins, either through use of the franchisor's form
contract or though a company enforced policy, should meet the
Fortner test with reference to any appreciable number of present or
prospective franchisee-buyers within the market.
Two potential problems may arise in attempting to define the
market: First, where the market is overwhelmingly large, proof of a
is provided for "according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may
Id. § 116. But see 2 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETrrION
deem reasonable ....
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 38.2(b)(2), at 174 (3d ed. 1968), where it is noted that
although the requisite economic power may be inferred from the tying product's uniqueness, even absent a showing of market dominance, a trademark is not ipso facto unique.
129 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1970). See also id. §§ 1066-68.
130 See note 128 supra. The existence of such a barrier was one of the basic principles
underlying the Chicken Delight holding. Noting that although the trademark, unlike the
patent and copyright, does not foreclose competitors from offering the underlying product
in the market, the court found that the trademark right does erect a legal barrier against
competition. 448 F.2d at 50. Competitors could offer the same product for sale under a
different mark, but could not offer the same product under the same mark or the mark
itself for sale. Thus, if one accepts the proposition that a trademark can be a product, in the
sense of a tying product, see note 52 supra, one cannot deny that the same legal barrier that
exists in the case of a patent or copyright is present.
131 This inquiry is itself divided into two parts:
(1) the relevant product market, i.e., the area of goods or services in which the products
subject to the restraint effectively compete; and
(2) the relevant geographicmarket, i.e., the geographic or territorial area in which the
defendant can effectively compete.
1 J. von Kalinowski, ANTITRusT LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 6.02[4][b], at 6-126 (1975)
(footnotes omitted).
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tie-in with respect to an appreciable number of buyers is a massive
undertaking; and second, a court may construe the word "appreciable" to mean "the overwhelming majority." In such a case, the per
se doctrine could well lose all its vitality. It is suggested, however,
that a plaintiff faced with either or both of the above problems may
look to Loew's for assistance. Although the Loew's Court focused on
the concept of uniqueness or consumer appeal, it also stated that in
a case concerning a unique tying product, "it should seldom be
necessary . . .to embark upon a full-scale factual inquiry into the
scope of the relevant market ... and into the corollary problem of

the seller's percentage share in that market. 1 32 Since both Loew's and
Fortner were tying cases, it might be argued that a successful Fortner
demonstration, i.e. some buyers in the market were victimized by
the tie-in, is of probative value to plaintiffs in meeting the Loew's
burden of proving that the tying item is unique or desirable to
buyers in that market.
The Loew's-Fortner approach could be applied equally well to
franchising arrangements where the trademark represents the
source of the goods produced by the franchisor rather than being a
representation of the quality of the finished product, which is often
prepared on the franchisee's premises. It cannot be denied that
competitors of the franchisor are foreclosed from offering such a
product bearing his distinctive trademark to the buyers in the
market, i.e., present or potential franchisees.
If the franchisor's trademark is not separate and distinct from
the product to which it is affixed, then that product cannot be
distributed by his competitors through franchisees who have opted
to bind themselves to the franchisor. Hence, in this situation, too, a
showing that the franchisor has the ability to drive a tie-in of other
products to such a trademarked "tying" commodity with respect to
an appreciable number of present or prospective franchisees would
be persuasive evidence of such a commodity's uniqueness and desirability, and thus, evidence of a possible section 3 Clayton Act
violation. Indeed, if sufficient economic power in the tying
trademarked commodity can be established under the Loew'sFortner test of uniqueness and desirability, the plaintiff need not
proceed to show that a requisite amount of commerce in the tied
33
product was foreclosed.'
371 U.S. at 45 n.4 (emphasis added).
the tying product is a commodity, the plaintiff need not satisfy both conditions
for a per se Sherman Act violation, since a showing of either condition is sufficient to prove
a per se violation under the Clayton Act. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953); Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d
"1

133 When
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PATENT AND COPYRIGHT PRESUMPTION
THROUGH

THE

"BACKLASH"

APPROACH -

AN

ANALOGY

TO

TRADEMARKS

As was noted earlier, a tying arrangement wherein the tying
product is patented or copyrighted is an attempted extension of
the limited monopoly already afforded a patent or copyright owner. 3 4 The Loew's Court, which confirmed the existence of this
presumption, stated that it had its roots in cases where the plaintiff
was also the patentee.1 35 Historically, if a patentee sued for
infringement 3 6 of his patent, proof of the use of the patent to
violate the antitrust laws was a complete defense.
As an outgrowth of these cases, the presumption was developed and applied when the patentee was a defendant in an antitrust suit. Thus, this historical approach by the courts - denying
relief in patent infringement cases an'd the consequent invoking of
the presumption in patent tie-in cases -is
essentially a backlash
response to the attempted extension of the patent monopoly. To
test the suitability of this approach when dealing with trademarks,
one might inquire whether courts have denied relief in trademark
infringement suits where the mark has been used in violation of
the antitrust laws, specifically, where the mark has been used in
connection with a tying arrangement. The cases previously examined which have come to the conclusion that the presumption
should be invoked in the case of a trademark have done so by
either a comparison of the trademark with the patent and
copyright, or an assessment of the trademark's dominance in its
own right. It is suggested that the courts could also easily adopt the
backlash logic previously invoked in the patent infringement cases
as a reason for invoking the presumption in the case of a
trademark.
One of the earliest cases involving a patent infringement suit
55, 62 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); Trademark Franchising,supra note
16, at 1097.
131 See text accompanying notes 103-08 supra.
35 The Court stated that:
This principle grew out of a long line of patent cases which had eventuated in the
doctrine that a patentee who utilized tying arrangements would be denied all relief
against infringements of his patent.... These cases reflect a hostility to use of the
statutorily granted patent monopoly to extend the patentee's economic control to
unpatented products. The patentee is protected as to his invention, but may not use
his patent rights to exact tribute for other articles.
371 U.S. at 46 (citations omitted). The Court went on to state that this logic was extended to
copyrights in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 371 U.S. at 46.
136 An infringer is one who, without authority, "makes, uses or sells any patented
invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor ... " 35 U.S.C. §
271 (1970).
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in which an antitrust violation was asserted as a defense was Morton
.Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.1 37 In Morton Salt, the district court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the
complaint because the plaintiff was using its patent to effect an
illegal tying arrangement. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, unable to find any substantial lessening of competition or
the creation of a monopoly, reversed. The Supreme Court, in
reversing the Seventh Circuit, stated that the question was not
whether plaintiff had in fact violated the Clayton Act, but rather
whether a court of equity would lend its aid in protecting the
patent monopoly where the owner used the patent as a means of
restraining competition.13' The patent monopoly is granted pursuant to constitutional authorization, 139 but the public policy which
gives limited protection to inventions meriting a patent excludes all
that is not embraced in the invention.1 40 Under these circumstances, equity may rightfully withhold assistance in an infringement suit and should do so at least until it appears that the improper practice has ceased."' Stating that the suit should be dismissed
for want of equity, the Court did not reach the question of whether
14 2
there was a Clayton Act violation.
Under section 33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act,' 4 3 relief in a

trademark infringement suit may similarly be denied.1 44 In perti137 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
138
Id. at 490.
'

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, quoted in note I supra.

140 314 U.S. at 492.
141
42

Id. at 493.

1 Id. at 494.
143 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, et seq. (1970). This legislation states in part:

If the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable under section 1065
of this title, the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive
rights to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods
or services specified in the affidavit filed under the provisions of said section 1065
subject to any conditions or limitations stated therein except when one of the
following defenses or defects is established:
(7) That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the
United States.
Id. § 1115(b).
141 Several courts have criticized any analogy between the patent and the trademark in
this respect. In Waco-Porter Corp. v. Tubular Structures Corp. of America, 222 F. Supp. 332
(S.D. Cal. 1963), plaintiff instituted an action for patent and trademark infringement. The
court commented that "there should not be a trademark misuse doctrine ... [analogous to]
the patent misuse doctrine, and where there are no unclean hands, the claim of trademark
misuse should not constitute a defense. This is because the foundations of the claims are
different." Id. at 333. See also United States v. Steffens (Trade-Mark Cases), 100 U.S. 82,
93-95 (1879), stating that any attempt to identify the essential characteristics of a trademark
with those of a patent or copyright will produce insurmountable difficulties. While the
trademark is recognized as the product of a considerable period of use, the patent results
from invention. The trademark is a result of accident rather than design. Id. at 94.
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nent part, this section states that "[i]f the right to use the registered
mark has become incontestable ... the registration [of such mark]
shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use
the registered mark in commerce [except when the defense that]
the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws" is
established. 4 5 Congressional policy thus evinced by section 33(b)(7)
of the Lanham Act is persuasive evidence that a trademark which is
permitted to "exact tribute for other articles"' 46 is as abrasive to the
antitrust policy as any patent or copyright misuse might be. Indeed, in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States1 4 7 the.Supreme
Court reinforced this view. Timken was a civil action brought by the
United States to prevent and restrain violations of the Sherman
Act. Pursuant to Timken's licensing of its trademark, the defendant and its licensees had allocated trade territories among themselves, fixed prices on products of one sold in the territory of the
others, and cooperated to protect each other's markets and eliminate outside competition. The Supreme Court held that restraints
of trade cannot be justified as reasonable steps taken to implement
a trademark licensing scheme. Moreover, the Court appeared to
give its approval to the completeness of the antitrust defense under
the Lanham Act when it stated that "[a] trademark cannot be
legally used as a device for Sherman Act violation. Indeed, the
Trade Mark Act . . . itself penalizes use of a mark 'to violate the
antitrust laws of the United States.' "148
The extent to which the trademark owner is penalized when
the mark is used to violate the antitrust laws was dealt with in a
trademark infringement suit in Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. J.A.
Buchroeder & Co.' 49 Upon an agreed stipulation of the facts and
controversies, one of the issues presented to the court was whether
an assumed violation of the antitrust laws is a total defense to a
trademark infringement action. The court held in the affirmative.' 5 0 Although noting that the origin and nature of patents and
trademarks are in many respects totally dissimilar,' 5 1 the court
14515 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (1970).
146 United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46 (1962).
147 341 U.S. 593 (1951). Although Timken was not the starting point for a trademark
misuse defense, it has been applied to pierce the trademark shield in several antitrust cases.
FranchiseMisuse, supra note 11, at 1152.
148 341 U.S. at 599 (footnote omitted).
149 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
50
Id. at 974.
151Id. at 976-77. See note 144 supra; Coca-Cola Co. v. Howard Johnson Co., 386 F.
Supp. 330, 336 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1314
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971). See
also Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir. 1974). These
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stated that the doctrines of patent and trademark misuse have
experienced a somewhat parallel development. 1 5 2 This is particularly true in the case where either has been extended beyond the
limits of its protected area. 15 3 Equity courts developed principles to
54
protect trademarks long before statutes authorized registration.
Indeed, with principles of equity in mind, Congress sought to make
it clear that the holder of a trademark who seeks the protection
afforded by registration must come into court with clean hands. 15 5
Congressional debates also clearly indicate that one who violates
the antitrust laws does not have clean hands.15 6 Having considered
these factors, the Phi Delta Theta court concluded that section
33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act provided an affirmative defense in a suit
57
for trademark infringement.1
courts have, for the most part, recognized that the patent grant is a limited monopoly and
that when it is involved in commercial restraints, the patent itself is usually the vehicle of
violation. The grant of a trademark, however, does not give the holder thereof the exclusive
right to manufacture and sell any particular article, service, or process.
152251 F. Supp. at 977. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 576 n. ll
(1972); Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (use of
patents in antitrust violations). The Carbice Court noted that "[r]estrictions on the manner of
use, essential to prevent unwarranted extension, are inherent in other limited monopolies.
Thus, a trademark may not be used as a means of misrepresentation." Id. at 35 n.5 (emphasis
added). The fact that Carbice was decided before the passage of the Lanham Act does not
detract from its reference to a trademark as a limited monopoly. The monopoly granted a
trademark was developed in equity, and is still based on equitable concepts. Indeed, the
Lanham Act does not preempt the common law protection of trademarks; it merely plays a
collateral role. FranchiseMisuse, supra note 11, at 1149. See also Note, The Antitrust Defense in
Trademark Infringement Actions, 45 VA. L. REV. 94, 100-02 (1959).
"1 251 F. Supp. at 977.
154 The equitable reasons for protection of the trademark were twofold:
First, the
owner's investment in his mark should be protected; and second, the public should be
protected from any "passing off of a product or service different from that related to the
trademark of its owner." Franchise Misuse, supra note 11, at 1147-48.
155 92 CONG. REC. 7872-74 (1946) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney).
56
d. at 7874 (remarks of Senator Hawkes).
117 251 F. Supp. at 974; accord, Fortsmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F.R.D.
367, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (dictum) (mark may not be enforced where it has been or is being
used to violate the antitrust laws); FranchiseMisuse, supra note 11, at 1147; Lockhart, Violation
of the Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions, 31 MINN. L. REV. 507, 566-68 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as Lockhart]. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1946); 92
CONG. REC. 7636 (1946) (remarks of Senator Hawkes); id. at 7872-73 (remarks of Senator
O'Mahoney). But see Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971). In Stiftung, plaintiffs
brought an action for trademark infringement and defendants interposed the defense that
the mark had been used, among other alleged antitrust violations, to effect illegal tying
arrangements. The court did not find sufficient evidence to establish that the trademark was
the prime causal factor in the implementation of the antitrust violations and indicated its
agreement with plaintiffs' contention that the defense should be stricken because section
33(b)(7) is not a defense to an infringement suit, but rather a defense to the incontestability
of the mark. 298 F. Supp. at 1311-14. The surface intent of the statute is that the antitrust
defense is available only to destroy the conclusive evidentiary force of registration under
section 33(b), and thus, throw an owner back into section 33(a), which makes registration of
the mark prior to the Lanham Act only prima facie evidence of the registrant's exclusive
right to use the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1970); Lockhart, supra, at 566-67. Under section
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The Phi Delta Theta holding was recently qualified in Coca-Cola
8 wherein it was held that the trademark
Co. v. HowardJohnson Co., 15
must be the competent producing element which serves to effectuate the antitrust violation in order to invoke the violation as a
complete defense to a trademark infringement suit. 15 9 The Coca60
Cola court confirmed that such was the case in Phi Delta Theta, 1
for in that case for "all intents and purposes, the grant of
trademark registration ... resulted in a monopoly of the product
just as if it had been patented.' 16 1 Where a trademark is used to
drive a tie-in, it is a competent producing element of the antitrust
violation, 162 and such misuse should be a complete defense to a
trademark infringement action.
33(a), a plaintiff in an infringement suit would be subject to "any legal or equitable defense
or defect which might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered." 15 U.S.C. §
1115(a) (1970).
The Styitung court relied heavily on the legislative history of section 33(b)(7) in the
House of Representatives and concluded that the purpose of the statute was not to limit the
substantive law of trademarks, but to defeat the incontestability which results from registration of the mark when it is used to effect an antitrust violation. A review of the legislative
history of § 33(b) led the court to conclude that these defenses were intended "to [neither]
enlarge,restrict, amend, or modify the substantivelaw of trademarks ....[nor] deprive the registrantof
any rights he would possess or enjoy ifthis act were not enacted into law." 298 F. Supp. at 1312,
quoting 92 CONG. REc. 7524 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Lanham) (emphasis added by court).
Proof of a violation of the antitrust laws by the registrant does not destroy the continued
validity or right to continued use of the mark by the registrant, but merely would destroy its
incontestability. 298 F. Supp. at 1312, quoting 92 CONG. REc. 7523 (1946) (remarks of Rep.
Lanham). Unlike the Phi Delta Theta court,,the Stiftung court paid little attention to the
contrary legislative history in the Senate, stating that it was "ambiguous and general." 298 F.
Supp. at 1313-14.
1' 386 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
,59
Id. at 335-37. The Coca-Cola court noted that this essential element was not present in
Stiftung. Id. at 335-36. The Stiftung court found that defendants had completely failed to
prove that plaintiffs used the trademarks to violate the antitrust laws. 298 F. Supp. at 1315.
More pointedly, the defendants had directed their efforts merely toward proof of a collateral violation involving the use of goods bearing the marks. Id. Collateral violations occur
where the trademark itself is not used as a prime and competent producing cause to
effectuate antitrust activity. Id. at 1315-16. Defenses based on trademark misuse have been
rejected in almost every case where only collateral violations have been involved. Id. at 1314.
See FrandiseMisuse, supra note 11, at 1152-53, wherein the author notes that the 33(b)(7)
defense has been given "grudging application by the courts which often find that... there
may be an antitrust violation,... [but not one] so intimately related to the trademark as to
bar enforceability." Id.
160 386 F. Supp. at 335-36. The marks in Phi Delta Theta were being used to effect an
exclusive dealing arrangement by and between certain fraternities and the manufacturer of
insignia goods. The registration by the fraternities of their trademarks with the grant of an
exclusive license therefor to the manufacturer thus provided, under color of legal right, the
exclusive privilege to the manufacturer in the insignia goods business. 251 F. Supp. at 971.
The Coca-Cola court termed this arrangement a classic case of a trademark being used
directly in restraint of trade. 386 F. Supp. at 336. Interestingly, the Second Circuit may not
recognize the view of both Phi Delta Theta and Coca-Cola. Cf. Franchised Stores of New York,
Inc. v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664, 668-70 (2d Cir. 1968) (section 33(b)(7) not raised in trademark
infringement action against Carvel franchisee, but court implied it would not be available).
161386 F. Supp. at 336. But see 2 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
162

§ 38.2(b)(2) (3d ed. 1968).

See, e.g., Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381
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Thus, there is some indication of congressional and judicial
intent to follow the reasoning invoked in patent infringement cases
and to bar trademark infringement suits where the mark is used to
effect antitrust violations. Although the patent presumption developed within the context of patent infringement cases, it might well
have been established even if there had been no history of antitrust
abuses in patent infringement actions. As previously indicated, the
trademark presumption was conceived without reliance on or reference to trademark infringement defenses with corresponding
antitrust violations. 16 3 However, a comparison of the infringement
suits where antitrust violations were raised as a defense with the
antitrust actions seeking affirmative relief via the patent or
trademark presumption suggests that the decisions are in conformity with strict enforcement of congressional policy in the antitrust
field. 164 If there exists a question of balancing interests between the
statutory duty of a trademark owner to protect his mark 165 and the
policy of the antitrust laws, the scales should be tipped in favor of
66
rigorous adherence to the statutory dictates of the antitrust laws. 1
CONCLUSION

Proving a per se violation of the Sherman Act in cases of tie-ins
67
is by no means the only method of establishing a violation of law.'
U.S. 125 (1965). Notwithstanding its holding on the trademark presumption issue, the Carvel
majority acknowledged that the true tying item was the trademark, and, in comparison, the
patented
items were virtually without motivating significance. Id.
63
' See text accompanying notes 136-137 supra.
'1 Cf FranchiseMisuse, supra note 11, at 1147 ("an antitrust violation is not condoned by
trademark law .... ); Trademark Franchising,supra note 16, at 1115 (Congress subordinated
the Lanham
Act to the antitrust laws). See also note 152 supra.
65
See note 23 supra.
166 This is not to say, of course, that the antitrust laws take precedence in all cases over
'

every other policy of the law. There must be a balancing of interests, but where there are
alternatives which may foster a valid competing policy, such as the right to protect the
goodwill of a trademark, without violating antitrust policy, such avenues must be taken. Cf.
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955
(1972); Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39, 46 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
851 (1962). In some cases, bare restraints of trade may be justified. See Kolene Corp. v.
Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Mich. 1969),aff'd, 440 F.2d 77 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F.
Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). In Kolene, for example, a
tie-in requirement was held not unreasonable because of the need for uniformity and
quality, together with the difficulties encountered in supervising a nationwide operation. 307
F. Supp. at 1270. In the context of a franchise, however, the quality control policy of the
trademark law rarely justifies the tying of supply sources to the trademark. Trademark
Franchising, supra note 16, at 1117.
167 See note 16 supra. In Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
the court noted that if a plaintiff cannot meet the requirements for the per se rule, he still
can prove antitrust liability on the part of the defendant based on a rule of reason test. "To
be successful under the rule of reason the plaintiff must prove that the complained of
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Therefore, a court's failure to invoke the trademark presumption
does not, in and of itself, warrant a granting of summary judgment
against the party alleging the unlawful tie-in. 168 The per se doctrine provides only a welcome shortcut.
Courts unwilling to adopt the trademark presumption might be
persuaded to adhere to the following approach. It has been suggested that the patent presumption should not be blindly adhered
to in all instances, but should be the subject of a rebuttable pre69
sumption of sufficient economic power over the tying product.
The burden would then be on the patentee to go forward with
evidence showing that his patent does not possess sufficient economic power.' 70 This is a heavy burden indeed, but the adoption
of such an approach would reflect the congressional policy favoring free and full competition.' 7' It is suggested that the same
rationale be followed in the case of trademarks. A presumption of
sufficient economic power over the tying product to appreciably
restrain free competition in the tied product would shift the burden of going forward to the trademark owner to prove that his
mark did not possess sufficient economic power. The ultimate
burden of proof on the issue of requisite economic power, of
course, remains with the party challenging the tie-in.
Concededly weak trademarks, viz. marks of much less than
national reputation and totally local marks, should be subject to the
same rule as are concededly strong marks. In both situations,
Congress has granted the owner of the mark a true monopoly. The
trademark holder cannot be allowed to extend his monopoly unlawfully, and should not be permitted to deny its existence until
practices are an unreasonable restraint on commerce and consequently have an anticompetiive effect."
Id. at 1055 n.18.
16'See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
169 2 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §

38.2(b)(2), at 172-73 (3d ed. 1968). The author suggests that all patents do not confer a
substantial or even a significant amount of market power. Thus, the patentee should be able
to go forward and show that within the entire factual setting the patent does not possess the
requisite economic power over the tying product. Id.
I7' This is consistent with the policy that one who engages in restraint of trade on a per
se level must bear the burden of proving that the act engaged in is an exception to the rule.
Cf. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50-51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
955 (1972) (defense that tie-ins were necessary to calculate royalties and to maintain quality
control rejected); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 555-56 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), affd per curian, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (new industry defense sustained).
171 Congress intended to cover the broadest range of activities it could through the
enactment of the Sherman Act, and there is a heavy presumption against implicit exemption
from it. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). See generally Connell Constr.
Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). Since implied antitrust immunity is not
favored, only where there is "a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the
antitrust laws and the regulatory system" will immunity be found. United States v. National
Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975).
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satisfactory proof negating the monopolistic character of the
trademark is introduced. Under the approach suggested above,
however, the burden carried by the owner of a "weak" trademark
would be substantially less than that of his stronger counterpart.*
Stephen J. Smirti, Jr.
* Editor's Note: As this Note was being printed, two significant cases were reported on
this topic. In Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1976-2 Trade Cas.)
61,091 (8th Cir. Sept. 29, 1976), the court, while noting that "[a] franchise license
constitutes a separate and distinct marketable item," id. at 69,949, refused to consider
whether sufficiency of economic power should be automatically presumed in all cases where
the tying product is a trademark, id. at 69,950. In Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d
39 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit, in an apparent rebuff of the Warriner Hermetics court's
position on the trademark presumption, see text accompanying note 60 supra, held that the
existence of economic power in a trademark is always a question of fact. 536 F.2d at 49.

